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good； sometimes directly； sometimes indirectly。 The man who submits to
a surgical operation feels it no doubt as a bad thing； but by their
reason he and everyone acknowledge it to be good。 If a man who
delights in annoying and vexing peaceable people at last receives a
right good beating； this is no doubt a bad thing； but everyone
approves it and regards it as a good thing； even though nothing else
resulted from it； nay； even the man who receives it must in his reason
acknowledge that he has met justice； because he sees the proportion
between good conduct and good fortune； which reason inevitably
places before him； here put into practice。
No doubt our weal and woe are of very great importance in the
estimation of our practical reason； and as far as our nature as
sensible beings is concerned； our happiness is the only thing of
consequence； provided it is estimated as reason especially requires；
not by the transitory sensation； but by the influence that this has on
our whole existence； and on our satisfaction therewith； but it is
not absolutely the only thing of consequence。 Man is a being who； as
belonging to the world of sense； has wants； and so far his reason
has an office which it cannot refuse； namely； to attend to the
interest of his sensible nature； and to form practical maxims； even
with a view to the happiness of this life； and if possible even to
that of a future。 But he is not so pletely an animal as to be
indifferent to what reason says on its own account； and to use it
merely as an instrument for the satisfaction of his wants as a
sensible being。 For the possession of reason would not raise his worth
above that of the brutes； if it is to serve him only for the same
purpose that instinct serves in them； it would in that case be only
a particular method which nature had employed to equip man for the
same ends for which it has qualified brutes； without qualifying him
for any higher purpose。 No doubt once this arrangement of nature has
been made for him he requires reason in order to take into
consideration his weal and woe； but besides this he possesses it for a
higher purpose also； namely； not only to take into consideration
what is good or evil in itself； about which only pure reason；
uninfluenced by any sensible interest； can judge； but also to
distinguish this estimate thoroughly from the former and to make it
the supreme condition thereof。
In estimating what is good or evil in itself； as distinguished
from what can be so called only relatively； the following points are
to be considered。 Either a rational principle is already conceived； as
of itself the determining principle of the will； without regard to
possible objects of desire （and therefore by the more legislative form
of the maxim）； and in that case that principle is a practical a priori
law； and pure reason is supposed to be practical of itself。 The law in
that case determines the will directly； the action conformed to it
is good in itself； a will whose maxim always conforms to this law is
good absolutely in every respect and is the supreme condition of all
good。 Or the maxim of the will is consequent on a determining
principle of desire which presupposes an object of pleasure or pain；
something therefore that pleases or displeases； and the maxim of
reason that we should pursue the former and avoid the latter
determines our actions as good relatively to our inclination； that is；
good indirectly； i。e。； relatively to a different end to which they are
means）； and in that case these maxims can never be called laws； but
may be called rational practical precepts。 The end itself； the
pleasure that we seek； is in the latter case not a good but a welfare；
not a concept of reason； but an empirical concept of an object of
sensation； but the use of the means thereto； that is； the action； is
nevertheless called good （because rational deliberation is required
for it）； not however； good absolutely； but only relatively to our
sensuous nature； with regard to its feelings of pleasure and
displeasure； but the will whose maxim is affected thereby is not a
pure will； this is directed only to that in which pure reason by
itself can be practical。
This is the proper place to explain the paradox of method in a
critique of practical reason； namely； that the concept of good and
evil must not be determined before the moral law （of which it seems as
if it must be the foundation）； but only after it and by means of it。
In fact； even if we did not know that the principle of morality is a
pure a priori law determining the will； yet； that we may not assume
principles quite gratuitously； we must； at least at first； leave it
undecided； whether the will has merely empirical principles of
determination； or whether it has not also pure a priori principles；
for it is contrary to all rules of philosophical method to assume as
decided that which is the very point in question。 Supposing that we
wished to begin with the concept of good； in order to deduce from it
the laws of the will； then this concept of an object （as a good） would
at the same time assign to us this object as the sole determining
principle of the will。 Now； since this concept had not any practical a
priori law for its standard； the criterion of good or evil could not
be placed in anything but the agreement of the object with our feeling
of pleasure or pain； and the use of reason could only consist in
determining in the first place this pleasure or pain in connexion with
all the sensations of my existence； and in the second place the
means of securing to myself the object of the pleasure。 Now； as
experience alone can decide what conforms to the feeling of
pleasure； and by hypothesis the practical law is to be based on this
as a condition； it follows that the possibility of a priori
practical laws would be at once excluded； because it was imagined to
be necessary first of all to find an object the concept of which； as a
good； should constitute the universal though empirical principle of
determination of the will。 But what it was necessary to inquire
first of all was whether there is not an a priori determining
principle of the will （and this could never be found anywhere but in a
pure practical law； in so far as this law prescribes to maxims
merely their form without regard to an object）。 Since； however； we
laid the foundation of all practical law in an object determined by
our conceptions of good and evil； whereas without a previous law
that object could not be conceived by empirical concepts； we have
deprived ourselves beforehand of the possibility of even conceiving
a pure practical law。 On the other hand； if we had first
investigated the latter analytically； we should have found that it
is not the concept of good as an object that determines the moral
law and makes it possible； but that； on the contrary； it is the
moral law that first determines the concept of good and makes it
possible； so far as it deserves the name of good absolutely。
This remark； which only concerns the method of ultimate ethical
inquiries； is of importance。 It explains at once the occasion of all
the mistakes of philosophers with respect to the supreme principle
of morals。 For they sought for an object of the will which they
could make the matter and principle of a law （which consequently could
not determine the will directly； but by means of that object
referred to the feeling of pleasure or pain； whereas they ought
first to have searched for a law that would determine the will a
priori and directly； and afterwards determine the object in accordance
with the will）。 Now； whether they placed this object of pleasure；
which was to supply the supreme conception of goodness； in
happiness； in perfection； in moral ＇feeling＇； or in the will of God；
their principle in every case implied heteronomy； and they must
inevitably e upon empirical conditions of a moral law； since
their object； which was to be the immediate principle of the will；
could not be called good or bad except in its immediate relation to
feeling； which is always empirical。 It is only a formal law… that
is； one which prescribes to reason nothing more than the form of its
universal legislation as the supreme condition of its maxims… that can
be a priori a determining principle of practical reason。 The
ancients avowed this error without concealment by directing all
their moral inquiries to the determination of the notion of the summum
bonum； which they intended afterwards to make the determining
principle of the will in the moral law； whereas it is only far
later； when the moral law has been first established for itself； and
shown to be the direct determining principle of the will； that this
object can be presented to the will； whose form is now determined a
priori； and this we shall undertake in the Dialectic of the pure
practical reason。 The moderns； with whom the question of the summum
bonum has gone out of fashion； or at least seems to have bee a
secondary matter； hide the same error under vague （expressions as in
many other cases）。 It shows itself； nevertheless； in their systems； as
it always produces heteronomy of practical reason； and from this can
never be derived a moral law giving universal mands。
Now； since the notions of good and evil； as consequences of the a
priori determination of the will； imply also a pure practical
principle； and therefore a causality of pure reason； hence they do not
originally refer to objects （so as to be； for instance； special
modes of the synthetic unity of the manifold of given intuitions in
one consciousness） like the pure concepts of the understanding or
categories of reason in its theoretic employment； on the contrary；
they presuppose that objects are given； but they are all modes
（modi） of a single category； namely； that of causality； the
determining principle of which consists in the rational conception
of a law； which as a law of freedom reason gives to itself； thereby
a priori proving itself practical。 However； as the actions on the
one side e under a law which is not a physical law； but a law of
freedom； and consequently belong to the conduct of beings in and
consequently the consequently belong to the beings in the world of
intelligence； yet on the other side as events in the world of sense
they belong to phenomena； hence the determinations of a practical
reason are only possible in reference to the latter and； therefore； in
accordance with the categories of the understanding； not indeed with a
view to any theoretic employment of it； i。e。； so as to bring the
manifold of （sensible） intuition under one consciousness a priori； but
only to subject the manifold of desires to the unity of
consciousness of a practical reason； giving it mands in the moral
law； i。e。； to a pure will a priori。
These categories of freedom… for so we choose to call them in
contrast to those theoretic categories which are categories of
physical nature… have an obvious advantage over the latter； inasmuch
as the latter are only forms of thought which designate objects in
an indefinite manner by means of universal concept of every possible
intuition； the former； on the contrary； refer to the determination
of a free elective will （to which indeed no exactly corresponding
intuition can be assigned； but which has as its foundation a pure
practical a priori law； which is not the case with any concepts
belonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive faculties）； hence；
instead of the form of intuition （space and time）； which does not
lie in reason itself； but has to be drawn from another source； namely；
the sensibility； these being elementary practical concepts have as
their foundation the form of a pure will； which is given in reason
and； therefore； in the thinking faculty itself。 From this it happens
that as all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the
determination of the will； not with the physical conditions （of
practical ability） of the execution of one's purpose； the practical
a priori principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom
are at once cognitions； and have not to wait for intuitions in order
to acquire significance； and that for this remarkable reason；
because they themselves produce the reality of that to which they
refer （the intention of the will）； which is not the case with
theoretical concepts。 Only we must be careful to observe that these
categories only apply to the practical reason； and thus they proceed
in order from those which are as yet subject to sensible conditions
and morally indeterminate to those which are free from sensible
conditions and determined merely by the moral law。
Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good
and Evil。
I。 QUANTITY。
Subjective； according to maxims （practical opinions of the
individual）
Objective； according to principles （Precepts）
A priori both objective and subjective principles of freedom
（laws）
II。 QUALITY。
Practical rules of action （praeceptivae）
Practical rules of omission （prohibitivae）
Practical rules of exceptions （exceptivae）
III。 RELATION。
To personality To the condition of the person。