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III。 RELATION。
To personality To the condition of the person。
Reciprocal； of one person to the others of the others。
IV。 MODALITY。
The Permitted and the Forbidden
Duty and the contrary to duty。
Perfect and imperfect duty。
It will at once be observed that in this table freedom is considered
as a sort of causality not subject to empirical principles of
determination； in regard to actions possible by it； which are
phenomena in the world of sense； and that consequently it is
referred to the categories which concern its physical possibility；
whilst yet each category is taken so universally that the
determining principle of that causality can be placed outside the
world of sense in freedom as a property of a being in the world of
intelligence； and finally the categories of modality introduce the
transition from practical principles generally to those of morality；
but only problematically。 These can be established dogmatically only
by the moral law。
I add nothing further here in explanation of the present table；
since it is intelligible enough of itself。 A division of this kind
based on principles is very useful in any science； both for the sake
of thoroughness and intelligibility。 Thus； for instance； we know
from the preceding table and its first number what we must begin
from in practical inquiries； namely； from the maxims which every one
founds on his own inclinations； the precepts which hold for a
species of rational beings so far as they agree in certain
inclinations； and finally the law which holds for all without regard
to their inclinations； etc。 In this way we survey the whole plan of
what has to be done； every question of practical philosophy that has
to be answered； and also the order that is to be followed。
Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement。
It is the notions of good and evil that first determine an object of
the will。 They themselves； however； are subject to a practical rule of
reason which； if it is pure reason； determines the will a priori
relatively to its object。 Now； whether an action which is possible
to us in the world of sense； es under the rule or not； is a
question to be decided by the practical judgement； by which what is
said in the rule universally （in abstracto） is applied to an action in
concreto。 But since a practical rule of pure reason in the first place
as practical concerns the existence of an object； and in the second
place as a practical rule of pure reason implies necessity as
regards the existence of the action and； therefore； is a practical
law； not a physical law depending on empirical principles of
determination； but a law of freedom by which the will is to be
determined independently on anything empirical （merely by the
conception of a law and its form）； whereas all instances that can
occur of possible actions can only be empirical； that is； belong to
the experience of physical nature； hence； it seems absurd to expect to
find in the world of sense a case which； while as such it depends only
on the law of nature； yet admits of the application to it of a law
of freedom； and to which we can apply the supersensible idea of the
morally good which is to be exhibited in it in concreto。 Thus； the
judgement of the pure practical reason is subject to the same
difficulties as that of the pure theoretical reason。 The latter；
however； had means at hand of escaping from these difficulties；
because； in regard to the theoretical employment； intuitions were
required to which pure concepts of the understanding could be applied；
and such intuitions （though only of objects of the senses） can be
given a priori and； therefore； as far as regards the union of the
manifold in them； conforming to the pure a priori concepts of the
understanding as schemata。 On the other hand； the morally good is
something whose object is supersensible； for which； therefore； nothing
corresponding can be found in any sensible intuition。 Judgement
depending on laws of pure practical reason seems； therefore； to be
subject to special difficulties arising from this； that a law of
freedom is to be applied to actions； which are events taking place
in the world of sense； and which； so far； belong to physical nature。
But here again is opened a favourable prospect for the pure
practical judgement。 When I subsume under a pure practical law an
action possible to me in the world of sense； I am not concerned with
the possibility of the action as an event in the world of sense。
This is a matter that belongs to the decision of reason in its
theoretic use according to the law of causality； which is a pure
concept of the understanding； for which reason has a schema in the
sensible intuition。 Physical causality； or the condition under which
it takes place； belongs to the physical concepts； the schema of
which is sketched by transcendental imagination。 Here； however； we
have to do； not with the schema of a case that occurs according to
laws； but with the schema of a law itself （if the word is allowable
here）； since the fact that the will （not the action relatively to
its effect） is determined by the law alone without any other
principle； connects the notion of causality with quite different
conditions from those which constitute physical connection。
The physical law being a law to which the objects of sensible
intuition； as such； are subject； must have a schema corresponding to
it… that is； a general procedure of the imagination （by which it
exhibits a priori to the senses the pure concept of the
understanding which the law determines）。 But the law of freedom
（that is； of a causality not subject to sensible conditions）； and
consequently the concept of the unconditionally good； cannot have
any intuition； nor consequently any schema supplied to it for the
purpose of its application in concreto。 Consequently the moral law has
no faculty but the understanding to aid its application to physical
objects （not the imagination）； and the understanding for the
purposes of the judgement can provide for an idea of the reason； not a
schema of the sensibility； but a law； though only as to its form as
law； such a law； however； as can be exhibited in concreto in objects
of the senses； and therefore a law of nature。 We can therefore call
this law the type of the moral law。
The rule of the judgement according to laws of pure practical reason
is this： ask yourself whether； if the action you propose were to
take place by a law of the system of nature of which you were yourself
a part； you could regard it as possible by your own will。 Everyone
does； in fact； decide by this rule whether actions are morally good or
evil。 Thus； people say： 〃If everyone permitted himself to deceive；
when he thought it to his advantage； or thought himself justified in
shortening his life as soon as he was thoroughly weary of it； or
looked with perfect indifference on the necessity of others； and if
you belonged to such an order of things； would you do so with the
assent of your own will？〃 Now everyone knows well that if he
secretly allows himself to deceive； it does not follow that everyone
else does so； or if； unobserved； he is destitute of passion； others
would not necessarily be so to him； hence； this parison of the
maxim of his actions with a universal law of nature is not the
determining principle of his will。 Such a law is； nevertheless； a type
of the estimation of the maxim on moral principles。 If the maxim of
the action is not such as to stand the test of the form of a universal
law of nature； then it is morally impossible。 This is the judgement
even of mon sense； for its ordinary judgements； even those of
experience； are always based on the law of nature。 It has it therefore
always at hand； only that in cases where causality from freedom is
to be criticised； it makes that law of nature only the type of a law
of freedom； because； without something which it could use as an
example in a case of experience； it could not give the law of a pure
practical reason its proper use in practice。
It is therefore allowable to use the system of the world of sense as
the type of a supersensible system of things； provided I do not
transfer to the latter the intuitions； and what depends on them； but
merely apply to it the form of law in general （the notion of which
occurs even in the monest use of reason； but cannot be definitely
known a priori for any other purpose than the pure practical use of
reason）； for laws； as such； are so far identical； no matter from
what they derive their determining principles。
Further； since of all the supersensible absolutely nothing ＇is
known＇ except freedom （through the moral law）； and this only so far as
it is inseparably implied in that law； and moreover all
supersensible objects to which reason might lead us； following the
guidance of that law； have still no reality for us； except for the
purpose of that law； and for the use of mere practical reason； and
as reason is authorized and even pelled to use physical nature
（in its pure form as an object of the understanding） as the type of
the judgement； hence； the present remark will serve to guard against
reckoning amongst concepts themselves that which belongs only to the
typic of concepts。 This； namely； as a typic of the judgement； guards
against the empiricism of practical reason； which founds the practical
notions of good and evil merely on experienced consequences （so…called
happiness）。 No doubt happiness and the infinite advantages which would
result from a will determined by self…love； if this will at the same
time erected itself into a universal law of nature； may certainly
serve as a perfectly suitable type of the morally good； but it is
not identical with it。 The same typic guards also against the
mysticism of practical reason； which turns what served only as a
symbol into a schema； that is； proposes to provide for the moral
concepts actual intuitions； which； however； are not sensible
（intuitions of an invisible Kingdom of God）； and thus plunges into the
transcendent。 What is befitting the use of the moral concepts is
only the rationalism of the judgement； which takes from the sensible
system of nature only what pure reason can also conceive of itself；
that is； conformity to law； and transfers into the supersensible
nothing but what can conversely be actually exhibited by actions in
the world of sense according to the formal rule of a law of nature。
However； the caution against empiricism of practical reason is much
more important； for mysticism is quite reconcilable with the purity
and sublimity of the moral law； and； besides； it is not very natural
or agreeable to mon habits of thought to strain one's imagination
to supersensible intuitions； and hence the danger on this side is
not so general。 Empiricism； on the contrary； cuts up at the roots
the morality of intentions （in which； and not in actions only；
consists the high worth that men can and ought to give to themselves）；
and substitutes for duty something quite different； namely； an
empirical interest； with which the inclinations generally are secretly
leagued； and empiricism； moreover； being on this account allied with
all the inclinations which （no matter what fashion they put on）
degrade humanity when they are raised to the dignity of a supreme
practical principle； and as these； nevertheless； are so favourable
to everyone's feelings； it is for that reason much more dangerous than
mysticism； which can never constitute a lasting condition of any great
number of persons。
CHAPTER III。 Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason。
What is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral
law should directly determine the will。 If the determination of the
will takes place in conformity indeed to the moral law； but only by
means of a feeling； no matter of what kind； which has to be
presupposed in order that the law may be sufficient to determine the
will； and therefore not for the sake of the law； then the action
will possess legality； but not morality。 Now； if we understand by
motive （elater animi） the subjective ground of determination of the
will of a being whose reason does not necessarily conform to the
objective law； by virtue of its own nature； then it will follow；
first； that not motives can be attributed to the Divine will； and that
the motives of the human will （as well as that of every created
rational being） can never be anything else than the moral law； and
consequently that the objective principle of determination must always
and alone be also the subjectively sufficient determining principle of
the action； if this is not merely to fulfil the letter of the law；
without containing its spirit。*
*We may say of every action that conforms to the law； but is not
done for the sake of the law； that it is morally good in the letter；
not in the spirit （the intention）。
Since； then； for the purpose of giving the moral law influence
over the will； we must not seek for any other motives that might
enable us to dispense with the motive of the law itself； because
that would produce mere hypocrisy； without consistency； and it is even
dangerous to allow other motives （for instance； that