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that would produce mere hypocrisy； without consistency； and it is even
dangerous to allow other motives （for instance； that of interest） even
to co…operate along with the moral law； hence nothing is left us but
to determine carefully in what way the moral law bees a motive； and
what effect this has upon the faculty of desire。 For as to the
question how a law can be directly and of itself a determining
principle of the will （which is the essence of morality）； this is； for
human reason； an insoluble problem and identical with the question：
how a free will is possible。 Therefore what we have to show a priori
is not why the moral law in itself supplies a motive； but what
effect it； as such； produces （or； more correctly speaking； must
produce） on the mind。
The essential point in every determination of the will by the
moral law is that being a free will it is determined simply by the
moral law； not only without the co…operation of sensible impulses； but
even to the rejection of all such； and to the checking of all
inclinations so far as they might be opposed to that law。 So far；
then； the effect of the moral law as a motive is only negative； and
this motive can be known a priori to be such。 For all inclination
and every sensible impulse is founded on feeling； and the negative
effect produced on feeling （by the check on the inclinations） is
itself feeling； consequently； we can see a priori that the moral
law； as a determining principle of the will； must by thwarting all our
inclinations produce a feeling which may be called pain； and in this
we have the first； perhaps the only； instance in which we are able
from a priori considerations to determine the relation of a
cognition （in this case of pure practical reason） to the feeling of
pleasure or displeasure。 All the inclinations together （which can be
reduced to a tolerable system； in which case their satisfaction is
called happiness） constitute self…regard （solipsismus）。 This is either
the self…love that consists in an excessive fondness for oneself
（philautia）； or satisfaction with oneself （arrogantia）。 The former
is called particularly selfishness； the latter self…conceit。 Pure
practical reason only checks selfishness； looking on it as natural and
active in us even prior to the moral law； so far as to limit it to the
condition of agreement with this law； and then it is called rational
self…love。 But self…conceit reason strikes down altogether； since
all claims to self…esteem which precede agreement with the moral law
are vain and unjustifiable； for the certainty of a state of mind
that coincides with this law is the first condition of personal
worth （as we shall presently show more clearly）； and prior to this
conformity any pretension to worth is false and unlawful。 Now the
propensity to self…esteem is one of the inclinations which the moral
law checks； inasmuch as that esteem rests only on morality。
Therefore the moral law breaks down self…conceit。 But as this law is
something positive in itself； namely； the form of an intellectual
causality； that is； of freedom； it must be an object of respect；
for； by opposing the subjective antagonism of the inclinations； it
weakens self…conceit； and since it even breaks down； that is；
humiliates； this conceit； it is an object of the highest respect
and； consequently； is the foundation of a positive feeling which is
not of empirical origin； but is known a priori。 Therefore respect
for the moral law is a feeling which is produced by an intellectual
cause； and this feeling is the only one that we know quite a priori
and the necessity of which we can perceive。
In the preceding chapter we have seen that everything that
presents itself as an object of the will prior to the moral law is
by that law itself； which is the supreme condition of practical
reason； excluded from the determining principles of the will which
we have called the unconditionally good； and that the mere practical
form which consists in the adaptation of the maxims to universal
legislation first determines what is good in itself and absolutely；
and is the basis of the maxims of a pure will； which alone is good
in every respect。 However； we find that our nature as sensible
beings is such that the matter of desire （objects of inclination；
whether of hope or fear） first presents itself to us； and our
pathologically affected self； although it is in its maxims quite unfit
for universal legislation； yet； just as if it constituted our entire
self； strives to put its pretensions forward first； and to have them
acknowledged as the first and original。 This propensity to make
ourselves in the subjective determining principles of our choice serve
as the objective determining principle of the will generally may be
called self…love； and if this pretends to be legislative as an
unconditional practical principle it may be called self…conceit。 Now
the moral law； which alone is truly objective （namely； in every
respect）； entirely excludes the influence of self…love on the
supreme practical principle； and indefinitely checks the
self…conceit that prescribes the subjective conditions of the former
as laws。 Now whatever checks our self…conceit in our own judgement
humiliates； therefore the moral law inevitably humbles every man
when he pares with it the physical propensities of his nature。
That； the idea of which as a determining principle of our will humbles
us in our self…consciousness； awakes respect for itself； so far as
it is itself positive and a determining principle。 Therefore the moral
law is even subjectively a cause of respect。 Now since everything that
enters into self…love belongs to inclination； and all inclination
rests on feelings； and consequently whatever checks all the feelings
together in self…love has necessarily； by this very circumstance； an
influence on feeling； hence we prehend how it is possible to
perceive a priori that the moral law can produce an effect on feeling；
in that it excludes the inclinations and the propensity to make them
the supreme practical condition； i。e。； self…love； from all
participation in the supreme legislation。 This effect is on one side
merely negative； but on the other side； relatively to the
restricting principle of pure practical reason； it is positive。 No
special kind of feeling need be assumed for this under the name of a
practical or moral feeling as antecedent to the moral law and
serving as its foundation。
The negative effect on feeling （unpleasantness） is pathological；
like every influence on feeling and like every feeling generally。
But as an effect of the consciousness of the moral law； and
consequently in relation to a supersensible cause； namely； the subject
of pure practical reason which is the supreme lawgiver； this feeling
of a rational being affected by inclinations is called humiliation
（intellectual self…depreciation）； but with reference to the positive
source of this humiliation； the law； it is respect for it。 There is
indeed no feeling for this law； but inasmuch as it removes the
resistance out of the way； this removal of an obstacle is； in the
judgement of reason； esteemed equivalent to a positive help to its
causality。 Therefore this feeling may also be called a feeling of
respect for the moral law； and for both reasons together a moral
feeling。
While the moral law； therefore； is a formal determining principle of
action by practical pure reason； and is moreover a material though
only objective determining principle of the objects of action as
called good and evil； it is also a subjective determining principle；
that is； a motive to this action； inasmuch as it has influence on
the morality of the subject and produces a feeling conducive to the
influence of the law on the will。 There is here in the subject no
antecedent feeling tending to morality。 For this is impossible；
since every feeling is sensible； and the motive of moral intention
must be free from all sensible conditions。 On the contrary； while
the sensible feeling which is at the bottom of all our inclinations is
the condition of that impression which we call respect； the cause that
determines it lies in the pure practical reason； and this impression
therefore； on account of its origin； must be called； not a
pathological but a practical effect。 For by the fact that the
conception of the moral law deprives self…love of its influence； and
self…conceit of its illusion； it lessens the obstacle to pure
practical reason and produces the conception of the superiority of its
objective law to the impulses of the sensibility； and thus； by
removing the counterpoise； it gives relatively greater weight to the
law in the judgement of reason （in the case of a will affected by
the aforesaid impulses）。 Thus the respect for the law is not a
motive to morality； but is morality itself subjectively considered
as a motive； inasmuch as pure practical reason； by rejecting all the
rival pretensions of selflove； gives authority to the law； which now
alone has influence。 Now it is to be observed that as respect is an
effect on feeling； and therefore on the sensibility； of a rational
being； it presupposes this sensibility； and therefore also the
finiteness of such beings on whom the moral law imposes respect； and
that respect for the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being； or
to any being free from all sensibility； in whom； therefore； this
sensibility cannot be an obstacle to practical reason。
This feeling （which we call the moral feeling） is therefore produced
simply by reason。 It does not serve for the estimation of actions
nor for the foundation of the objective moral law itself； but merely
as a motive to make this of itself a maxim。 But what name could we
more suitably apply to this singular feeling which cannot be
pared to any pathological feeling？ It is of such a peculiar kind
that it seems to be at the disposal of reason only； and that pure
practical reason。
Respect applies always to persons only… not to things。 The latter
may arouse inclination； and if they are animals （e。g。； horses； dogs；
etc。）； even love or fear； like the sea； a volcano； a beast of prey；
but never respect。 Something that es nearer to this feeling is
admiration； and this； as an affection； astonishment； can apply to
things also； e。g。； lofty mountains； the magnitude； number； and
distance of the heavenly bodies； the strength and swiftness of many
animals； etc。 But all this is not respect。 A man also may be an object
to me of love； fear； or admiration； even to astonishment； and yet
not be an object of respect。 His jocose humour； his courage and
strength； his power from the rank be has amongst others； may inspire
me with sentiments of this kind； but still inner respect for him is
wanting。 Fontenelle says； 〃I bow before a great man； but my mind
does not bow。〃 I would add； before an humble plain man； in whom I
perceive uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am
conscious of in myself；… my mind bows whether I choose it or not；
and though I bear my head never so high that he may not forget my
superior rank。 Why is this？ Because his example exhibits to me a law
that humbles my self…conceit when I pare it with my conduct： a law；
the practicability of obedience to which I see proved by fact before
my eyes。 Now； I may even be conscious of a like degree of uprightness；
and yet the respect remains。 For since in man all good is defective；
the law made visible by an example still humbles my pride； my standard
being furnished by a man whose imperfections； whatever they may be；
are not known to me as my own are； and who therefore appears to me
in a more favourable light。 Respect is a tribute which we cannot
refuse to merit； whether we will or not； we may indeed outwardly
withhold it； but we cannot help feeling it inwardly。
Respect is so far from being a feeling of pleasure that we only
reluctantly give way to it as regards a man。 We try to find out
something that may lighten the burden of it； some fault to
pensate us for the humiliation which such which such an example
causes。 Even the dead are not always secure from this criticism；
especially if their example appears inimitable。 Even the moral law
itself in its solemn majesty is exposed to this endeavour to save
oneself from yielding it respect。 Can it be thought that it is for any
other reason that we are so ready to reduce it to the level of our
familiar inclination； or that it is for any other reason that we all
take such trouble to make it out to be the chosen precept of our own
interest well understood； but that we want to be free from the
deterrent respect which shows us our own unworthiness with such
severity？ Nevertheless； on the other hand； so little is there pain
in it that if once one has laid aside self…conceit and allowed
practical influence to that respect； he can never be satisfied with
contemplating the majesty of this law； and the soul believes itself
elevated in proportion as it sees the holy law elevated above it and
its frail nature。 No doubt great talents and activity proportioned
to them may also occasion respect or an analogous feeling。 It is
very proper to yield it to them； and then it appears as if this
sentiment were the same thing as admiration。 But if we look closer