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and strictness； as the precept of the Gospel does。 When I give the
name idea to a perfection to which nothing adequate can be given in
experience； it does not follow that the moral ideas are thing
transcendent； that is something of which we could not even determine
the concept adequately； or of which it is uncertain whether there is
any object corresponding to it at all； as is the case with the ideas
of speculative reason； on the contrary； being types of practical
perfection； they serve as the indispensable rule of conduct and
likewise as the standard of parison。 Now if I consider Christian
morals on their philosophical side； then pared with the ideas of
the Greek schools； they would appear as follows： the ideas of the
Cynics； the Epicureans； the Stoics； and the Christians are： simplicity
of nature； prudence； wisdom； and holiness。 In respect of the way of
attaining them； the Greek schools were distinguished from one
another thus that the Cynics only required mon sense； the others
the path of science； but both found the mere use of natural powers
sufficient for the purpose。 Christian morality； because its precept is
framed （as a moral precept must be） so pure and unyielding； takes from
man all confidence that be can be fully adequate to it； at least in
this life； but again sets it up by enabling us to hope that if we
act as well as it is in our power to do； then what is not in our power
will e in to our aid from another source； whether we know how
this may be or not。 Aristotle and Plato differed only as to the origin
of our moral conceptions。
In this manner； the moral laws lead through the conception of the
summum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to
religion； that is； to the recognition of all duties as divine
mands； not as sanctions； that is to say； arbitrary ordinances of
a foreign and contingent in themselves； but as essential laws of every
free will in itself； which； nevertheless； must be regarded as mands
of the Supreme Being； because it is only from a morally perfect
（holy and good） and at the same time all…powerful will； and
consequently only through harmony with this will； that we can hope
to attain the summum bonum which the moral law makes it our duty to
take as the object of our endeavours。 Here again； then； all remains
disinterested and founded merely on duty； neither fear nor hope
being made the fundamental springs； which if taken as principles would
destroy the whole moral worth of actions。 The moral law mands me to
make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all
my conduct。 But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than by the
harmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the world；
and although the conception of the summum bonum as a whole； in which
the greatest happiness is conceived as bined in the most exact
proportion with the highest degree of moral perfection （possible in
creatures）； includes my own happiness； yet it is not this that is
the determining principle of the will which is enjoined to promote the
summum bonum； but the moral law； which； on the contrary； limits by
strict conditions my unbounded desire of happiness。
Hence also morality is not properly the doctrine how we should
make ourselves happy； but how we should bee worthy of happiness。 It
is only when religion is added that there also es in the hope of
participating some day in happiness in proportion as we have
endeavoured to be not unworthy of it。
A man is worthy to possess a thing or a state when his possession of
it is in harmony with the summum bonum。 We can now easily see that all
worthiness depends on moral conduct； since in the conception of the
summum bonum this constitutes the condition of the rest （which belongs
to one's state）； namely； the participation of happiness。 Now it
follows from this that morality should never be treated as a
doctrine of happiness； that is； an instruction how to bee happy；
for it has to do simply with the rational condition （conditio sine qua
non） of happiness； not with the means of attaining it。 But when
morality has been pletely expounded （which merely imposes duties
instead of providing rules for selfish desires）； then first； after the
moral desire to promote the summum bonum （to bring the kingdom of
God to us） has been awakened； a desire founded on a law； and which
could not previously arise in any selfish mind； and when for the
behoof of this desire the step to religion has been taken； then this
ethical doctrine may be also called a doctrine of happiness because
the hope of happiness first begins with religion only。
We can also see from this that； when we ask what is God's ultimate
end in creating the world； we must not name the happiness of the
rational beings in it； but the summum bonum； which adds a further
condition to that wish of such beings； namely； the condition of
being worthy of happiness； that is； the morality of these same
rational beings； a condition which alone contains the rule by which
only they can hope to share in the former at the hand of a wise
Author。 For as wisdom； theoretically considered； signifies the
knowledge of the summum bonum and； practically； the accordance of
the will with the summum bonum； we cannot attribute to a supreme
independent wisdom an end based merely on goodness。 For we cannot
conceive the action of this goodness （in respect of the happiness of
rational beings） as suitable to the highest original good； except
under the restrictive conditions of harmony with the holiness* of
his will。 Therefore； those who placed the end of creation in the glory
of God （provided that this is not conceived anthropomorphically as a
desire to be praised） have perhaps hit upon the best expression。 For
nothing glorifies God more than that which is the most estimable thing
in the world； respect for his mand； the observance of the holy duty
that his law imposes on us； when there is added thereto his glorious
plan of crowning such a beautiful order of things with corresponding
happiness。 If the latter （to speak humanly） makes Him worthy of
love； by the former He is an object of adoration。 Even men can never
acquire respect by benevolence alone； though they may gain love； so
that the greatest beneficence only procures them honour when it is
regulated by worthiness。
*In order to make these characteristics of these conceptions
clear； I add the remark that whilst we ascribe to God various
attributes； the quality of which we also find applicable to creatures；
only that in Him they are raised to the highest degree； e。g。； power；
knowledge； presence； goodness； etc。； under the designations of
omnipotence； omniscience； omnipresence； etc。； there are three that are
ascribed to God exclusively； and yet without the addition of
greatness； and which are all moral He is the only holy； the only
blessed； the only wise； because these conceptions already imply the
absence of limitation。 In the order of these attributes He is also the
holy lawgiver （and creator）； the good governor （and preserver） and the
just judge； three attributes which include everything by which God
is the object of religion； and in conformity with which the
metaphysical perfections are added of themselves in the reason。
That in the order of ends； man （and with him every rational being）
is an end in himself； that is； that he can never be used merely as a
means by any （not even by God） without being at the same time an end
also himself； that therefore humanity in our person must be holy to
ourselves； this follows now of itself because he is the subject of the
moral law； in other words； of that which is holy in itself； and on
account of which and in agreement with which alone can anything be
termed holy。 For this moral law is founded on the autonomy of his
will； as a free will which by its universal laws must necessarily be
able to agree with that to which it is to submit itself。
VI。 Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason Generally。
They all proceed from the principle of morality； which is not a
postulate but a law； by which reason determines the will directly；
which will； because it is so determined as a pure will； requires these
necessary conditions of obedience to its precept。 These postulates are
not theoretical dogmas but； suppositions practically necessary；
while then they do ＇not＇ extend our speculative knowledge； they give
objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general （by
means of their reference to what is practical）； and give it a right to
concepts； the possibility even of which it could not otherwise venture
to affirm。
These postulates are those of immortality； freedom positively
considered （as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the
intelligible world）； and the existence of God。 The first results
from the practically necessary condition of a duration adequate to the
plete fulfilment of the moral law； the second from the necessary
supposition of independence of the sensible world； and of the
faculty of determining one's will according to the law of an
intelligible world； that is； of freedom； the third from the
necessary condition of the existence of the summum bonum in such an
intelligible world； by the supposition of the supreme independent
good； that is； the existence of God。
Thus the fact that respect for the moral law necessarily makes the
summum bonum an object of our endeavours； and the supposition thence
resulting of its objective reality； lead through the postulates of
practical reason to conceptions which speculative reason might
indeed present as problems； but could never solve。 Thus it leads： 1。
To that one in the solution of which the latter could do nothing but
mit paralogisms （namely； that of immortality）； because it could not
lay hold of the character of permanence； by which to plete the
psychological conception of an ultimate subject necessarily ascribed
to the soul in self…consciousness； so as to make it the real
conception of a substance； a character which practical reason
furnishes by the postulate of a duration required for accordance
with the moral law in the summum bonum； which is the whole end of
practical reason。 2。 It leads to that of which speculative reason
contained nothing but antinomy； the solution of which it could only
found on a notion Problematically conceivable indeed； but whose
objective reality it could not prove or determine； namely； the
cosmological idea of an intelligible world and the consciousness of
our existence in it； by means of the postulate of freedom （the reality
of which it lays down by virtue of the moral law）； and with it
likewise the law of an intelligible world； to which speculative reason
could only point； but could not define its conception。 3。 What
speculative reason was able to think； but was obliged to leave
undetermined as a mere transcendental ideal； viz。； the theological
conception of the first Being； to this it gives significance （in a
practical view； that is； as a condition of the possibility of the
object of a will determined by that law）； namely； as the supreme
principle of the summum bonum in an intelligible world； by means of
moral legislation in it invested with sovereign power。
Is our knowledge； however； actually extended in this way by pure
practical reason； and is that immanent in practical reason which for
the speculative was only transcendent？ Certainly； but only in a
practical point of view。 For we do not thereby take knowledge of the
nature of our souls； nor of the intelligible world； nor of the Supreme
Being； with respect to what they are in themselves； but we have merely
bined the conceptions of them in the practical concept of the
summum bonum as the object of our will； and this altogether a
priori； but only by means of the moral law； and merely in reference to
it； in respect of the object which it mands。 But how freedom is
possible； and how we are to conceive this kind of causality
theoretically and positively； is not thereby discovered； but only that
there is such a causality is postulated by the moral law and in its
behoof。 It is the same with the remaining ideas； the possibility of
which no human intelligence will ever fathom； but the truth of
which； on the other hand； no sophistry will ever wrest from the
conviction even of the monest man。
VII。 How is it possible to conceive an Extension of Pure
Reason in a Practical point of view； without its
Knowledge as Speculative being enlarged at
the same time？
In order not to be too abstract； we will answer this question at
once in its application to the present case。 In order to extend a pure
cognition practically； there must be an a priori purpose given； that
is； an end as object （of the will）； which independently of all
theological principle is presented as practically necessary by an
imperative which determines the will directly （a categorical
imperative）； and in this case that is the summum bonum。 This； however；
is not possible without presupposing three theoretical conceptions
（for which； because they are mere conceptions of pure reason； no
corresponding intuition can be found； nor consequently by the path
of theory any objective reality）； namely； freedom；