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corresponding intuition can be found； nor consequently by the path
of theory any objective reality）； namely； freedom； immortality； and
God。 Thus by the practical law which mands the existence of the
highest good possible in a world； the possibility of those objects
of pure speculative reason is postulated； and the objective reality
which the latter could not assure them。 By this the theoretical
knowledge of pure reason does indeed obtain an accession； but it
consists only in this； that those concepts which otherwise it had to
look upon as problematical （merely thinkable） concepts； are now
shown assertorially to be such as actually have objects； because
practical reason indispensably requires their existence for the
possibility of its object； the summum bonum； which practically is
absolutely necessary； and this justifies theoretical reason in
assuming them。 But this extension of theoretical reason is no
extension of speculative； that is； we cannot make any positive use
of it in a theoretical point of view。 For as nothing is acplished
in this by practical reason； further than that these concepts are real
and actually have their （possible） objects； and nothing in the way
of intuition of them is given thereby （which indeed could not be
demanded）； hence the admission of this reality does not render any
synthetical proposition possible。 Consequently； this discovery does
not in the least help us to extend this knowledge of ours in a
speculative point of view； although it does in respect of the
practical employment of pure reason。 The above three ideas of
speculative reason are still in themselves not cognitions； they are
however （transcendent） thoughts； in which there is nothing impossible。
Now； by help of an apodeictic practical law； being necessary
conditions of that which it mands to be made an object； they
acquire objective reality； that is； we learn from it that they have
objects； without being able to point out how the conception of them is
related to an object； and this； too； is still not a cognition of these
objects； for we cannot thereby form any synthetical judgement about
them； nor determine their application theoretically； consequently；
we can make no theoretical rational use of them at all； in which use
all speculative knowledge of reason consists。 Nevertheless； the
theoretical knowledge； not indeed of these objects； but of reason
generally； is so far enlarged by this； that by the practical
postulates objects were given to those ideas； a merely problematical
thought having by this means first acquired objective reality。 There
is therefore no extension of the knowledge of given supersensible
objects； but an extension of theoretical reason and of its knowledge
in respect of the supersensible generally； inasmuch as it is pelled
to admit that there are such objects； although it is not able to
define them more closely； so as itself to extend this knowledge of the
objects （which have now been given it on practical grounds； and only
for practical use）。 For this accession； then； pure theoretical reason；
for which all those ideas are transcendent and without object； has
simply to thank its practical faculty。 In this they bee immanent
and constitutive； being the source of the possibility of realizing the
necessary object of pure practical reason （the summum bonum）；
whereas apart from this they are transcendent； and merely regulative
principles of speculative reason； which do not require it to assume
a new object beyond experience； but only to bring its use in
experience nearer to pleteness。 But when once reason is in
possession of this accession； it will go to work with these ideas as
speculative reason （properly only to assure the certainty of its
practical use） in a negative manner： that is； not extending but
clearing up its knowledge so as on one side to keep off
anthropomorphism； as the source of superstition； or seeming
extension of these conceptions by supposed experience； and on the
other side fanaticism； which promises the same by means of
supersensible intuition or feelings of the like kind。 All these are
hindrances to the practical use of pure reason； so that the removal of
them may certainly be considered an extension of our knowledge in a
practical point of view； without contradicting the admission that
for speculative purposes reason has not in the least gained by this。
Every employment of reason in respect of an object requires pure
concepts of the understanding （categories）； without which no object
can be conceived。 These can be applied to the theoretical employment
of reason； i。e。； to that kind of knowledge； only in case an
intuition （which is always sensible） is taken as a basis； and
therefore merely in order to conceive by means of… them an object of
possible experience。 Now here what have to be thought by means of
the categories in order to be known are ideas of reason； which
cannot be given in any experience。 Only we are not here concerned with
the theoretical knowledge of the objects of these ideas； but only with
this； whether they have objects at all。 This reality is supplied by
pure practical reason； and theoretical reason has nothing further to
do in this but to think those objects by means of categories。 This； as
we have elsewhere clearly shown； can be done well enough without
needing any intuition （either sensible or supersensible） because the
categories have their seat and origin in the pure understanding；
simply as the faculty of thought； before and independently of any
intuition； and they always only signify an object in general； no
matter in what way it may be given to us。 Now when the categories
are to be applied to these ideas； it is not possible to give them
any object in intuition； but that such an object actually exists；
and consequently that the category as a mere form of thought is here
not empty but has significance； this is sufficiently assured them by
an object which practical reason presents beyond doubt in the
concept of the summum bonum； the reality of the conceptions which
are required for the possibility of the summum bonum； without；
however； effecting by this accession the least extension of our
knowledge on theoretical principles。
When these ideas of God； of an intelligible world （the kingdom of
God）； and of immortality are further determined by predicates taken
from our own nature； we must not regard this determination as a
sensualizing of those pure rational ideas （anthropomorphism）； nor as a
transcendent knowledge of supersensible objects； for these
predicates are no others than understanding and will； considered too
in the relation to each other in which they must be conceived in the
moral law； and therefore； only so far as a pure practical use is
made of them。 As to all the rest that belongs to these conceptions
psychologically； that is； so far as we observe these faculties of ours
empirically in their exercise （e。g。； that the understanding of man
is discursive； and its notions therefore not intuitions but
thoughts； that these follow one another in time； that his will has its
satisfaction always dependent on the existence of its object； etc。；
which cannot be the case in the Supreme Being）； from all this we
abstract in that case； and then there remains of the notions by
which we conceive a pure intelligence nothing more than just what is
required for the possibility of conceiving a moral law。 There is
then a knowledge of God indeed； but only for practical purposes；
and； if we attempt to extend it to a theoretical knowledge； we find an
understanding that has intuitions； not thoughts； a will that is
directed to objects on the existence of which its satisfaction does
not in the least depend （not to mention the transcendental predicates；
as； for example； a magnitude of existence； that is duration； which；
however； is not in time； the only possible means we have of conceiving
existence as magnitude）。 Now these are all attributes of which we
can form no conception that would help to the knowledge of the object；
and we learn from this that they can never be used for a theory of
supersensible beings； so that on this side they are quite incapable of
being the foundation of a speculative knowledge； and their use is
limited simply to the practice of the moral law。
This last is so obvious； and can be proved so clearly by fact；
that we may confidently challenge all pretended natural theologians （a
singular name）* to specify （over and above the merely ontological
predicates） one single attribute； whether of the understanding or of
the will； determining this object of theirs； of which we could not
show incontrovertibly that； if we abstract from it everything
anthropomorphic； nothing would remain to us but the mere word； without
our being able to connect with it the smallest notion by which we
could hope for an extension of theoretical knowledge。 But as to the
practical； there still remains to us of the attributes of
understanding and will the conception of a relation to which objective
reality is given by the practical law （which determines a priori
precisely this relation of the understanding to the will）。 When once
this is done； then reality is given to the conception of the object of
a will morally determined （the conception of the summum bonum）； and
with it to the conditions of its possibility； the ideas of God；
freedom； and immortality； but always only relatively to the practice
of the moral law （and not for any speculative purpose）。
*Learning is properly only the whole content of the historical
sciences。 Consequently it is only the teacher of revealed theology
that can be called a learned theologian。 If； however； we choose to
call a man learned who is in possession of the rational sciences
（mathematics and philosophy）； although even this would be contrary
to the signification of the word （which always counts as learning only
that which one must be 〃learned〃 and which； therefore； he cannot
discover of himself by reason）； even in that case the philosopher
would make too poor a figure with his knowledge of God as a positive
science to let himself be called on that account a learned man。
According to these remarks it is now easy to find the answer to
the weighty question whether the notion of God is one belonging to
physics （and therefore also to metaphysics； which contains the pure
a priori principles of the former in their universal import） or to
morals。 If we have recourse to God as the Author of all things； in
order to explain the arrangements of nature or its changes； this is at
least not a physical explanation； and is a plete confession that
our philosophy has e to an end； since we are obliged to assume
something of which in itself we have otherwise no conception； in order
to be able to frame a conception of the possibility of what we see
before our eyes。 Metaphysics； however； cannot enable us to attain by
certain inference from the knowledge of this world to the conception
of God and to the proof of His existence； for this reason； that in
order to say that this world could be produced only by a God
（according to the conception implied by this word） we should know this
world as the most perfect whole possible； and for this purpose
should also know all possible worlds （in order to be able to pare
them with this）； in other words； we should be omniscient。 It is
absolutely impossible； however； to know the existence of this Being
from mere concepts； because every existential proposition； that is；
every proposition that affirms the existence of a being of which I
frame a concept； is a synthetic proposition； that is； one by which I
go beyond that conception and affirm of it more than was thought in
the conception itself； namely； that this concept in the
understanding has an object corresponding to it outside the
understanding； and this it is obviously impossible to elicit by any
reasoning。 There remains； therefore； only one single process
possible for reason to attain this knowledge； namely； to start from
the supreme principle of its pure practical use （which in every case
is directed simply to the existence of something as a consequence of
reason） and thus determine its object。 Then its inevitable problem；
namely； the necessary direction of the will to the summum bonum；
discovers to us not only the necessity of assuming such a First
Being in reference to the possibility of this good in the world；
but； what is most remarkable； something which reason in its progress
on the path of physical nature altogether failed to find； namely； an
accurately defined conception of this First Being。 As we can know only
a small part of this world； and can still less pare it with all
possible worlds； we may indeed from its order； design； and
greatness； infer a wise； good； powerful； etc。； Author of it； but not
that He is all…wise； all…good； all…powerful； etc。 It may indeed very
well be granted that we should be justified in supplying this
inevitable defect by a legitimate and reasonable hypothesis； namely；
that when wisdom； goodness； etc； are displayed in all the parts that
offer themselves to our nearer knowledge； it is just the same in all
the rest； and that it would therefore be reasonable to ascribe all
possible perfections to